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	<title>Comments on: The Pushmi-pullyu problem of assurance</title>
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	<link>http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/2010/03/20/the-pushmi-pullyu-problem-of-assurance/</link>
	<description>Tangled musings on identity, privacy, trust, and suchlike</description>
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		<title>By: Eve</title>
		<link>http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/2010/03/20/the-pushmi-pullyu-problem-of-assurance/comment-page-1/#comment-273305</link>
		<dc:creator>Eve</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Mar 2010 04:19:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I think possibly it could. To the extent that requirements can be expressed in unambiguous language, whether or not it ends up being machine-read in practice, is definitely a step up in any case.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think possibly it could. To the extent that requirements can be expressed in unambiguous language, whether or not it ends up being machine-read in practice, is definitely a step up in any case.</p>
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		<title>By: James</title>
		<link>http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/2010/03/20/the-pushmi-pullyu-problem-of-assurance/comment-page-1/#comment-273220</link>
		<dc:creator>James</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Mar 2010 17:16:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/?p=2212#comment-273220</guid>
		<description>Can Level of Protection leverage the proposed Oracle IGF (CARML and AAPML)?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Can Level of Protection leverage the proposed Oracle IGF (CARML and AAPML)?</p>
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		<title>By: Eve</title>
		<link>http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/2010/03/20/the-pushmi-pullyu-problem-of-assurance/comment-page-1/#comment-273177</link>
		<dc:creator>Eve</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Mar 2010 01:02:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/?p=2212#comment-273177</guid>
		<description>Agreed that bad guys are using this hole in the system to do bad things.  The article does give the impression, however, that perhaps as many as twice as many registrants have reasonable justification to be nervous about handing over good-quality data, vs. obvious bad guys who have nefarious reasons to lie.

Clearly the registrars could be deploying earlier and more sophisticated checks on the data (or accepting third-party sources for such data that they trust, as discussed above). Depending on how strongly the legitimate registrants feel about the inadequate protection of the data by ICANN, they could still foil some of these methods. It certainly seems that the situation is currently so dire that ICANN probably isn&#039;t in a mood to demand that registrars deploy methods with really high attribute assurance, because it&#039;s costly to do so. So the legitimate resisters will continue to get mixed in with the fraudsters, which is a shame.

My guess is that treating the data with more respect, and publicizing that they&#039;re doing so, would probably cause more good guys to give real data. What are the real use cases for random people looking up domain owners?  Could that be throttled a lot more?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Agreed that bad guys are using this hole in the system to do bad things.  The article does give the impression, however, that perhaps as many as twice as many registrants have reasonable justification to be nervous about handing over good-quality data, vs. obvious bad guys who have nefarious reasons to lie.</p>
<p>Clearly the registrars could be deploying earlier and more sophisticated checks on the data (or accepting third-party sources for such data that they trust, as discussed above). Depending on how strongly the legitimate registrants feel about the inadequate protection of the data by ICANN, they could still foil some of these methods. It certainly seems that the situation is currently so dire that ICANN probably isn&#8217;t in a mood to demand that registrars deploy methods with really high attribute assurance, because it&#8217;s costly to do so. So the legitimate resisters will continue to get mixed in with the fraudsters, which is a shame.</p>
<p>My guess is that treating the data with more respect, and publicizing that they&#8217;re doing so, would probably cause more good guys to give real data. What are the real use cases for random people looking up domain owners?  Could that be throttled a lot more?</p>
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		<title>By: Andy Steingruebl</title>
		<link>http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/2010/03/20/the-pushmi-pullyu-problem-of-assurance/comment-page-1/#comment-273166</link>
		<dc:creator>Andy Steingruebl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 21 Mar 2010 18:13:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/?p=2212#comment-273166</guid>
		<description>Eve,

With the inaccurate data and people not wanting to disclose it, I think we do unfortunately have to look at motive.

For those whose motive is what I&#039;d call typical &quot;privacy protection&quot; then there are legitimate services that provide this capability today. Unfortunately evidence has shown that the vast majority of private-proxy registrations are actually by those not with privacy motives, but illegal motives.

The real trick here is unfortunately going to be how to structure the system so that the system is general privacy preserving to the extent it should be, but that it still allows for unmasking of those behaving illegally.  

I don&#039;t yet know where that balance point is unfortunately.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Eve,</p>
<p>With the inaccurate data and people not wanting to disclose it, I think we do unfortunately have to look at motive.</p>
<p>For those whose motive is what I&#8217;d call typical &#8220;privacy protection&#8221; then there are legitimate services that provide this capability today. Unfortunately evidence has shown that the vast majority of private-proxy registrations are actually by those not with privacy motives, but illegal motives.</p>
<p>The real trick here is unfortunately going to be how to structure the system so that the system is general privacy preserving to the extent it should be, but that it still allows for unmasking of those behaving illegally.  </p>
<p>I don&#8217;t yet know where that balance point is unfortunately.</p>
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